The notion of Self plays a significant role in the philosophical speculations of Buddha and Wittgenstein. For the Buddha, ‘Self’ has empirical validity without ultimate reality. However, the Real Self is transcendent. It is the Absolute which is immanent as well as transcendent. It cannot therefore be bound to thought-constructions. The Absolute is Nirvāṇa; it is peaceful, immortal and unproduced which is unspeakable and can only be realised through immediate spiritual experience. To deal with Nirvāṇa rigourously, Buddha upholds a negative (...) method of describing it as final. He prefers to subscribe to the philosophy of silence, for the bliss of Nirvāṇa is beyond empirical reality. Some striking affinities with such Buddhist notion of Self can be found in Wittgensteinian philosophy of Self. For Wittgenstein, the ‘Self’ comes into being through one’s own world. The Self or the metaphysical subject does not belong to the world; rather it is the limit of the world. The metaphysical Self is different from the empirical Self or ego with which psychology deals. The psychological self pertains to and explains the worldly state-of-affair. Besides, the philosophical Self or I is not the human being, the human body or the human soul with psychological properties, but the boundary (not a part) of the world. Self or I is not the name of a person. It therefore is inexplicable. Since it is unspeakable, we must be silent about it, for whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. Wittgenstein finally submits that this is all that really matters in human life. A comparative study of the two great philosophers suggests that the Buddhist philosophy of Self apparently echoes in the Wittgensteinian philosophy of Self. (shrink)

The paper aims at bringing out a valid comparison between the notion of intentionality portrayed in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and that of Vijňānavāda in general. One of the crucial objectives of the Husserlian phenomenology is to understand the nature of consciousness. To Husserl, Consciousness is always intentional, that is, intended or directed towards something. It constitutes the world in the sense of bestowing meaning and being to the world. The object intended by consciousness may or may not be (...) there, but it certainly has a sense. Husserl makes a distinction between empirical and transcendental consciousness. To him, the empirical ego is momentary whilst the transcendental ego survives all reduction and presides over all epistemic acts. To explore whether the Vijňānavadins propose a similar notion of Consciousness and its intentionality would be the primary objective of the paper. On the other hand, to Vijňānavāda, the apparent external world is projected by the Absolute Consciousness, the Ālaya, not by the individual consciousness or Vijňāna. Vijňānavāda distinguishes between individual consciousness (pravritti Vijňāna) and absolute consciousness (Ālaya Vijňāna). All intentional acts are performed by the individual consciousness having the Ālaya Vijňāna as its background. The Ālaya manifests itself as subject and object as well as seven pravritti Vijňānas. They are intended and constituted by the Ālaya. It, therefore, follows that Ālaya is always intentionally correlated with the pravritti Vijňānas. Vijňānavāda appears to be a kind of constitutive phenomenology rather than idealism. (shrink)

Professional ethics, in general, deals with justified moral values that govern the work of professionals. Profession is an expertise who is committed to promote a distinctive public good, such as learning or education. Professionals are committed to special duties to make services available, maintain confidentiality, secure informed consent for services, and be loyal to clients, employers, and others with whom one has fiduciary relationship. Professional ethics deals with theoretical issues which seek to understand how the justified moral values governing professionals (...) are linked to wider values. It also deals with practical issues as to how to apply duties in particular contexts. Professional values include principles of obligation and rights, virtues, personal moral ideals as manifested in the great lives. Given such a Western idea of professional ethics, it is indeed fascinating to trace professional ethics in the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣadic sages since time immemorial have shown the path to peace and progress for all humanity, not only by laying down theoretical ideals or speculation, but by actually applying truths in their practical life. They have demonstrated the practical application of the ethical ideals or moral values in the personal and professional life and proved that self-realization alone can not only save man from misery but promote to the state of highest bliss. The standards laid down by them have been followed practically by people even today. Gītoponiṣad states that whatever action is performed by the great is imitated by the common people; whatever standard is set by him is followed by them. The Kaṭha Upaniṣad prescribes professional values to the extent that not he who has not ceased from evil conduct can obtain Him by knowledge. Good conduct as a value is thus emphasized here. In Taittirīya Upaniṣad, for instance, the teacher prescribes certain values in the form of commandments: speak the truth and practice virtue. Thus, it is evident that the Upaniṣadic teacher is not only concerned about the intellectual progress of the student but also its personal and professional life as well. The paper is a humble attempt to explore the roots of professional ethics in the Upaniṣadic ethics. (shrink)